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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEYS
DISBARMENT BY FEDERAL COURT FOR FAILURE
TO PERFORM DUTIES OF STATE OFFICE
A group of ministers and others brought proceedings in
federal district court to have the name of a Commonwealth's
Attorney of the state of Kentucky stricken from the rolls of
the federal court. The complaint alleged that the respondent
was unfit to be an attorney at law in federal court because
of his failure properly to discharge the duties of his office.
Evidence was introduced which indicated open and wide-
spread violations of the gambling laws over many years, dur-
ing which time respondent had held the office of Common-
wealth's Attorney. Held: Respondent's name ordered
stricken from the rolls of the federal district court.' Res-
pondent was on notice of the flagrant violations of the law
and therefore had a duty to investigate and prosecute. Wil-
bur et al. v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947).
Although there is no substantial doubt of the power of
the federal district court to take the disciplinary steps evi-
denced by the instant case,' strong policy arguments would
seem to militate against use of the federal power to correct
situations which are largely matters of state concern. The
problem thus presented is not a legalistic one, but involves
the compatibility of federal and state courts of concurrent
territorial jurisdiction. Several factors indicate that the
course here taken might be criticized as an unwise exercise
of federal authority.
1. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335 (U.S. 1871); Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 (U.S. 1868).
Kentucky also recognizes the inherent power of a court to discip-
line members of its own bar. Duffin v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky.
452, 271 S.W. 555 (1925).
Disciplinary proceedings in Indiana are regulated by Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1946 Repl.) §§ 4-3614 to 4-3618, and by Rules of the
Supreme Court, 3-22 to 3-26. For statutory authorization for the
Rules of the Supreme Court, see Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1946
Repl.) §§ 4-109 (general powers) and 4-3605 (giving the Supreme
Court exclusive jurisdiction over admission to the bar and dis-
ciplinary proceedings). But it has been held that the power of
the supreme court to frame rules is derived from the constitution
and not from the legislative act. Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693,
127 N.E. 441, 128 N.E. 353 (1920).
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The argument that striking from the rolls 2 of the federal
court has no effect upon respondent's capacity or ability to
execute the functions of his state office is of little force.
Certainly complainants were interested in the removal of res-
pondent from his state office. One can hardly assume that
they were attempting what they themselves considered a fu-
tile thing. Striking from the rolls in this case has the nec-
essary effect of exclusion from practice in many other fed-
eral courts,8 and might well be accorded the status of a prima
facie case for disbarment proceedings in Kentucky.4 In addi-
tion, a Commonwealth's Attorney in Kentucky has the duty
to represent his state in civil as well as criminal actions,
brought in the circuit court of his district." Though the
Commonwealth's Attorney is under no duty to appear in fed-
eral court in his official capacity," inability to do so, either
in that official capacity or as a special assistant to the attor-
ney-general, might seriously prejudice prosecution of just
claims of the state.
Disbarment in Kentucky does not, of course, necessarily
2. The court in the instant case (70 F. Supp. 930, 935) states "This
is not to disbar or impeach an attorney or a public official, but
to strike his name from the roll of this court." The dictionaries
seem to make no distinction between "disbarment" and "striking
from the rolls," other than to point out that historically disbarment
could apply only to attorneys and not to solicitors, who were
"stricken from the rolls." The term "disbarment" is in England
colloquial, and is effected by the particular Inn "vacating its
call." 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 876 (8th ed., Rawle, 1914).
It has been suggested that the judge in the instant case linked
formal admission to the bar with the licensing of an attorney to
practice in the courts of a state. Concededly, the action of the
federal court would not, per se, work a revocation of the attor-
ney's state license to practice, or "disbar" him in that sense. But
since the federal courts do not license attorneys, but enroll them
only, the action here seems to require as stringent adherence to the
rules of evidence and burden of proof as are required in any dis-
ciplinary proceedings short of those criminal in nature. In gen-
eral usage, the terms "disbarment" and "striking from the rolls"
are synonymous, and they are so used in this note in the interest
of brevity.
3. See e.g. Rules Fed. D. Ct., D. Ariz., Rule 2 (disbarment by any
court of competent jurisdiction grounds for disbarment in the
federal court); Rules Fed. D. Ct., S.D. Calif., Rule 30 (automatic
disbarment upon proof of disbarment by any state or federal
court).
4. The Rules of the Kentucky Court of Appeals make no provision
for recognition of foreign disbarment. It would seem likely that
such action would be at the very least res judicata as to the facts
found.
5. Ky. Rev. Stat. (Cullen, 1946) §69.010.
6. Slayton v. Rogers, 128 Ky. 106, 107 S.W. 696 (1908).
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follow from the federal court's action. Since disbarment is
not res judicata in another jurisdiction,7 there is apparently
nothing to compel a state court to recognize disbarment in a
federal court. Neither is disbarment in a state court bind-
ing upon the federal courts, except as proof of cause for
striking from the rolls of the state court which has taken
the disciplinary step.8 But disbarment by a federal court
would indicate a strong probability of subsequent loss of
standing before the state courts, upon proceedings being pro-
perly brought.
Additional argument for a hands-off policy by the federal
courts in such cases is found in the circumstance that the
constitution and statutes of Kentucky adequately provide for
the removal of Commonwealth's Attorney who are derelict in
their duties.9 They are amenable to the constitutional pro-
7. See supra nn. 3 and 4. This conclusion is evident from the na-
ture of the power of each jurisdiction over admission to practice
before its courts.
8. In re Tinkoff, 101 F.2d. 341 (C.C.A. 7th 1938). "The order of
disbarment by a state court necessarily determines that the mis-
conduct of the attorney constitutes cause for disbarment from
practice in the state court. To that extent it is binding upon
federal courts. But the order of disbarment does not create a
legal status of professional unworthiness which must be accepted
by the federal courts as an adjudicated fact for purposes of a
disbarment proceeding in a federal court. A state court is with-
out power to adjudicate what constitutes cause for disbarment in
a federal court." But local rules of court may alter this result.
See e.g. Rules Fed. D. Ct. S.D. Calif., Rule 30, cited supra n. 3.
9. It is worthy of note that previous attempts to remove the respon-
dent in the instant case from office by use of the processes herein
discussed uniformily met with failure. For a discussion of pre-
ceding actions against the respondent in the state courts, see
Note, 57.Yale L. J. 125 (1948). It is apparent, however, that the
lack of success of such efforts in no way militates against the argu-
ment that where state remedies are adequate on the face, the
federal court should not lend a gratuitous assist in the administra-
tion of the state statutes. The argument here is directed toward
showing that the state remedies are prima facie adequate and
that maladministration of the local law is a duty which the state
should not be permitted to shirk by casting the burden on the
federal courts.
Presumably even more difficulty would be encountered in In-
diana. On disbarment in Indiana generally, see Notes, 17 Ind. L. J.
551 (1942) ; 18 Ind. L. J. 234 (1943). The constitutional provision
for the removal of judges and prosecutors who have "been con-
victed of corruption or other high crime" is Ind. Const. 1852, Art.
7, §12. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-819 makes it a duty
of the Attorney-General to bring action under the constitutional
provision in cases where such a conviction has been had. The
supreme court alone has jurisdiction of the removal proceedings,
and the constitutional remedy is exclusive. State v. Dearth, 201
Ind. 1, 164 N.E. 489 (1929); State v. Patterson, 181 Ind. 660,
105 N.E. 228 (1914). Accordingly, judges and prosecutors are
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visions for impeachment,O and a conviction of bribery works
a forfeiture of office." These remedies are criminal in na-
ture, however, and subject to the accompanying burden of
proof. Conviction might therefore be difficult, especially
where, as here, no intimation of corruption was made, but a
simple charge of nonfeasance and apathy.12 Were these the
only remedies available, perhaps the precipitous action of
complainants in seeking the circuitous aid of the federal
court might be excused.
There is, however, a remedy available to complainants
by the disbarment processes of the state. Though disbarment
of prosecuting attorneys by state courts has been held to ef-
fect disqualification or removal from office only where the
prosecuting attorney is required to be admitted to the bar,13
Kentucky has such a provision in its constitutional require-
not subject to removal as "state officers" under the provisions of
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-801 to 49-818. The state-
nent in State ex rel. Spencer v. Criminal Court of Marion Co.,
214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938) that a prosecutor may be re-
moved "only by impeachment" must be understood to refer to the
provisions of Ind. Const. Art. 7, §12, since a prosecutor is not
liable to impeachment by the General Assembly. State v. Dearth,
supra.
There is no requirement that the prosecuting attorney be an
attorney or hat he be licensed to practice law. Ind. Const. Art. 7,§11; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-2501. Presumably,
therefore, disbarment would have no effect upon the tenure of
office of a prosecutor in Indiana. States having similar provisions
have held that a layman is eligible to hold the office. State ex
rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 133 N.W. 857 (1911);
People ex rel. Galvin v. Dorsey 32 Cal. 296 (1867). Contra:
State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) (name of office
implies that prosecuting attorney must be admitted to the bar).
Though it would appear, in consideration of the above pro-
visions, that a prosecutor in Indiana may not be removed for non-
feasance in office not constituting "corruption or other high crime,"
he is disqualified from acting as prosecutor during such time as
he is under indictment for a criminal offense. State v. Ellis, 184
Ind. 307, 112 N.E. 489 (1916).
10. Ky. Const. §66 to 68. Section 68 provides that "The Governor
and all civil officers shall be liable to impeachment for any mis-
demeanor in office. . . .
11. Ky. Rev. Stat. (Cullen, 1946) §432.350. See also §432.190, im-
posing a penal sanction for bribery. The similar Indiana statute
is found in Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §10-601.
12. 70 F. Supp. 930, 935.
13. Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98
S.W.2d 53 (1936); Commonwealth ex rel. Pike County Bar Ass'n
v. Stump, 247 Ky. 589, 57 S.W.2d 524 (1933); Brown v. Woods,
2 Okla. 601, 39 Pac. 473 (1895); In re Snyder, 301 Pa. 276, 152
Atl. 33 (1930); Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021(1909); State ex rel. Willis v. Montfort, 93 Wash. 4, 159 Pac.
889 (1916).
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ment that Commonwealth's Attorneys and county attorneys
be "licensed practicing attorneys."1' 4  Disbarment thus nec-
essarily creates a "vacancy in office."' 5
Disbarment proceedings are regulated by the Rules of
the Court of Appeals, which provide that such proceedings
may be instituted by "any person having knowledge of the
conduct complained of, or by the Board (of Bar Commis-
sioners) of its own motion."'16 Costs of prosecution are
chargeable to the Board, unless the complaint is frivolousY.'
The burden of proof is not onerous, 8 and the trial is in-
formal,' 9 the technical rules of pleading being inapplicable.20
No insulation is afforded by the state office; and disbarment
and consequent loss of office does not amount to an im-
peachment in violation of the constitutional provisions, since
the officer is " . . . the producer of his own disqualification,
and the following investigation . . . only for the purpose
of ascertaining and determining whether or not the dis-
qualification existed."'2' Such disbarment proceedings are
triable before a Trial Committee of the Board of Bar Com-
missioners, which must be presumed to be a body remote
enough to be disinterested, and concerned only with the inte-
grity of the Bar.22 It would appear that complainants should
properly resort first to the safety devices set up by their
state for the policing of its officers.
State courts have felt free to disbar prosecuting attor-
neys for unofficial misconduct 23 and for official misconduct
14. Ky. Const. §100.
15. For a definition of "vacancy in office," see Ky. Rev. Stat. (Cullen,
1946) §446.010- (27).
16. Rules Ky. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3.220.
17. Id., Rule 3.210. Frivolous complaints, Rule 3.230.
18. Id., Rule 3.410 (preponderance of the evidence). Commonwealth
ex rel. Buckingham v. Ward, 267 Ky. 627, 103 S.W.2d 177 (1933) ;
In re Darrow, 175 Ind. 44, 92 N.E. 369 (1910). Cf. In re Glad-
stone, 28 F.Supp. 858 (S.D. N.Y. 1939), in which the court re-
quired "convincing proof that the respondents were guilty of the
acts charged in the information."
19. Rules Ky. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3.190.
20. Id., Rule 3.200.
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Pike County Bar Ass'n v. Stump, 247 Ky.
589, 57 S.W.2d 524 (1933).
22. Rules Ky. Ct. of Appeals, Rule 3.160 (Board's jurisdiction of
trial); Rule 3.260 (Appointment of Trial Committee).
23. See e.g. Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41,
98 S.W.2d 53 (1936); In re Cram, 55 N.D. 876, 215 N.W. 682
(1927); In re Wakefield, 107 Vt. 180, 177 Atl. 319 (1935).
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involving intentional misstatement 24 or use of criminal pro-
secutions in aid of civil suits.2 But in cases involving such
discretionary matters as failure to prosecute or dismissal of
pending prosecutions, 26 there seems to be an almost uniform
finding of bribery or corruption. This is not a legal require-
ment, but a sort of inarticulate doctrine running through
the cases, and is evidenced only by the fact of its presence
in most of the reported cases in point. Practical reasons for
such a result-may be found in the judicial recognition giveu
to such factors as the following: Resentment by victims of
energetic prosecution, 27 political feuds, 28 the impossibility of
enforcing all laws at all times,21 and the need for protection
in the carrying out of official tasks.30 Possibly these factors
are implicit in the theory that public officials are entitled
to a presumption of proper motives in the conduct of their
offices.31 At any rate, since the state courts appear, at least,
to hesitate before chastising their own officers for delin-
quency in performing their duties, absent a clear showing of
bribery or corruption, it would seem inappropriate for the
federal courts to require less, even should one concede the pro-
priety of their acting at all in the policing of the state court
officers. Apparently no other federal court has done so.
24. In re Maestretti, 30 Nev. 187, 93 Pac. 1004 (1908); In re Jones,
70 Vt. 71, 39 At]. 1087 (1897).
25. In re Truder, 37 N.M. 69, 17 P.2d 951 (1932); In re Joyce, 282
Minn. 156, 234 N.W. 9 (1930); In re Bunston, 52 Mont. 83, 155
Pac. 1109 (1916).
26. Failure to prosecute: People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Anglim, 33
Colo. 40, 78 Pac. 687 (1904); Commonwealth ex rel. Pike County
Bar Ass'n v. Stump, 247 Ky. 589, 57 S.W.2d 524 (1933). Dis-
missal of pending prosecution: In re Norris, 60 Kan. 649, 57 Pac.
528 (1899). Cf. In re Voss, 11 N.D. 540, 90 N.W. 15 (1902).
On the duty to prosecute, generally, see Baker and DeLong,
"The Prosecuting Attorney: Powers and Duties in Criminal Pro-
secution" 24 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 1025 (1934).
27. In re Waggoner, 49 S.D. 78, 90, 206 N.W. 427, 432 (1925).
28. State v. Patterson, 181 Ind. 660, 665, 105 N.E. 228, 230 (1914);
State ex rel. Bourg v. Marrero, 132 La. 109, 144, 61 So. 136, 148(1913); In re Joyce, 182 Minn. 156, 158, 234 N.W. 9, 10, (1930).
29. See State ex rel. Bourg v. Marrero, 132 La. 109, 131, 61 So. 136,
144 (1913).
30. See In re McGarry, 380 I1. 359, 365, 44 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1942);
State v. Patterson, 181 Ind. 660, 665, 105 N.E. 228, 230 (1914).
31. See State ex rel. Coleman v. Trinkle, 70 Kan. 396, 402, 78 Pac.
854, 956 (1904); Maginnis Case, 269 Pa. 186, 197, 112 Atl. 555,
559 (1921).
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